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1. Introduction 
Norwegian criminal law has a long tradition of using a ‘medical model’ for the defi-
nition of criminal insanity.1 Under section 20 first paragraph, letter b of the Penal 
Code,2 a defendant who is psychotic at the time of the offence is absolved from crim-
inal responsibility. This provision essentially equates criminal insanity with psycho-
sis, and does not operate with any criteria requiring causality, or any other addition-
al (psychological) criteria as is the case in many countries.3
It has been questioned, particularly after the 22 July case,4 whether the medical 
1 See below in section 3. 
2 LOV-2005-05-20-28, the Penal Code (Lov om straff). For an English translation, see https://
lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2005-05-20-28 (All weblinks last accessed 9th September 2019)
3 For a comparative overview of criminal insanity regulations, see Simon & Ahn-Redding, 
The Insanity defense, the world over (Lexington books 2008); Stuckenberg, ‘Comparing legal 
approaches: mental disorders as grounds for excluding criminal responsibility’ Bergen Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 4(1) (2016) pp. 48–64. 
4 The case that followed Anders Behring Breivik’s killing of 77 people in Oslo and on Utøya in 
Norway on 22 July 2011, Oslo District Court, TOSLO–2011–1888627–24 (RG–2012–1153), 
available in English at http://lovdata.no/info/information_in_english.
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model gives an erroneous delimitation of who should be absolved from criminal 
responsibility and provides forensic experts with too much power in this determi-
nation. On the basis of this critique, new rules have now been proposed that will 
remove the psychosis criterion and replace it with a rule that opens the doors for 
a greater degree of judicial discretion.5 However, also under this new rule, psycho-
sis remains central to criminal insanity.6 The concept of psychosis is also central to 
insanity judgments in most countries and can be viewed as a common core of the 
western idea of criminal incapacity.7 
Core questions are, then, how psychosis is, and should be, related to criminal in-
sanity. In what way, to what extent, and on what grounds, is psychosis relevant for in-
sanity? Although Norwegian law explicitly ties criminal insanity to psychosis, it does 
not provide clear answers to these questions. In particular, in cases where the of-
fence(s) seems to be rational and/or planned, the understanding of insanity and psy-
chosis is a matter of debate. There is no comprehensive account in Norwegian crim-
inal law theory clarifying the legal relevance of psychosis. Given this background, 
we aim in this article to contribute to such a clarification by gathering together legal, 
forensic, and clinical empirical perspectives on the legal meaning and relevance of 
psychosis. Our clarification will include the interrelated problems of the law’s defini-
tion (of psychosis and insanity) and justification (why and to what extent psychosis is 
legally relevant). Although the current Norwegian criminal insanity rule will serve as 
our reference point, such clarification is of broad international relevance. 
The outline of the article will be as follows. Firstly, we will in sections 2–4 provide 
a somewhat deeper contextualisation and explanation of the significance of psycho-
sis in Norwegian law. These sections will include an overview of the criminal insanity 
regulation, the background and justifications for tying psychosis to criminal insanity, 
and a deeper explanation of the legal criteria of psychosis and its application in legal 
practice. With this in mind, we will in sections 5–6 explain how the legal criterion 
of psychosis is operationalised in forensic practice. As we will see, there is no full 
clarification about the legal relevance of psychosis. We will in section 7 draw some 
intermediate conclusions about this lack of a clear legal definition and point to some 
practical/clinical challenges as regards the evidence of psychosis. In order to gain 
greater understanding, we will in sections 8–10 investigate further the medical un-
derstanding of psychosis. Here, we will explore the medical definition of psychosis 
5 See Lovvedtak 60 (2018-2019) and Innst. 296 L (2018-2019). For a further explanation of the 
proposal and its background, see Gröning, ‘Hvordan skal vi avgjøre om alvorlig sinnslidelse 
innebærer utilregnelighet? Refleksjoner om lovforslaget i Prop. 154 L (2016–2017)’, Bergen 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 5(1) (2017) pp. 77–85; Gröning and Rieber Mohn, 
‘NOU 2014: 10 – proposal for new rules regarding criminal insanity and related issues, Norway 
post 22 July’, Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 3(1) (2015) pp. 109–131.
6 See Prop. 154 L (2016–2017) Endringer i straffeloven og straffeprosessloven mv. (skyldevne, 
samfunnsvern og sakkyndighet) p. 13 and p. 69, and Innst. 296 L (2018-2019) pp. 3–4. 
7 Moore 2015, ‘The quest for a responsible responsibility test: Norwegian law after Breivik’, 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 9(4) (2015) pp. 645–693. 
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and the relationship between psychosis and impaired reality testing from a medi-
cal perspective. Finally, we will in section 11 bring these perspectives together, draw 
some conclusions about the current state of law, and provide some recommendations 
for the future. 
2. Criminal Insanity in Norwegian Law: Overview
In order to discuss the significance of psychosis for criminal insanity in Norwegian 
law, first it is necessary to understand the general structure of the relevant rules and 
concepts. A good place to begin is, therefore, with the core assumption of the crimi-
nal law that individuals generally have the capacity to act criminally responsibly, i.e., 
have criminal capacity. Individuals do not always make use of this capacity, but nor-
mally they are expected to do so.
Criminal capacity at the time of the offence is in Norwegian law, as in most coun-
tries, a basic condition for criminal responsibility. Only certain conditions that are 
currently specified in the Penal Code section 20, first paragraph, letters a–d entail 
criminal incapacity and lead to unconditional exoneration from criminal responsi-
bility. This rule determines that the perpetrator is absolved from criminal responsi-
bility if he or she was: a) under 15 years old, b) psychotic, c) severely mentally dis-
abled, or d) had a severe impairment of consciousness at the time of the offence.8 The 
age limit of 15 years is absolute and will not be dealt with further in this article.9 The 
criterion ‘psychotic’ provides the rule about criminal insanity that will be our focus 
in the following. This criterion refers to the medical characterisation of psychosis, 
but the provision requires, as we will develop below in section 4, that the psychosis 
be discernible and have a qualitative impact on the perpetrator’s ability to compre-
hend reality at the time of the offence. It requires, more specifically, that the perpe-
trator’s ability to make a realistic assessment of his/her relationship to the surround-
ing world was significantly impaired at the time of the act.10 The criterion ‘severely 
mentally disabled’ refers to offenders with seriously impaired intellectual capacity. 
Whether this criterion is fulfilled depends on an overall evaluation of the function-
ing and intellectual capacities of the offender, where a functioning similar to an in-
telligence quotient below 55 normally entails incapacity.11 Finally, ‘severe impairment 
8 For a further explanation of these rules, see Gröning, Jacobsen & Husabø, Frihet, forbrytelse og 
straff: en systematisk fremstilling av norsk strafferett (Fagbokforlaget 2016) pp. 484–502. 
9 See further Gröning, ‘Kriminell lavalder – noen utgangspunkter’, Tidsskrift for strafferett 4 
(2014) pp. 314–332.
10 See Ot. prp. nr. 87 (1993-1994) p. 22, NOU 1990: 5 p. 38, NOU 2014: 10 p. 49, and Prop. 154 L 
(2016-2017). See also Gröning, Husabø & Jacobsen (2016) p. 495. 
11 See Søndenaa et al, ‘Criminal Responsibility and Challenges in the Criminal Justice System for 
People with Intellectual Disability in Norway’, Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice 7(1) 2019, pp. 97-109.
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of consciousness’ refers to cases where the perpetrator has acted without perceiving 
their surroundings whatsoever. An indication that the person was in a state which 
may qualify for this criterion is a substantial loss of memory assumed caused by loss 
of the ability to memorize due to the persons mental state. (imprinting). Thus, the 
person can act, but is to a large extent without ability to control or critically evaluate 
how he or she acts. Such cases can, for example, occur during sleepwalking or an 
epileptic seizure. In the second paragraph of section 20 of the Penal Code, there is an 
exception for incapacity triggered by self-induced intoxication that is applicable to 
criminal incapacity due to psychosis and impairment of consciousness.12 
These circumstances entailing criminal incapacity are all understood as excuses in 
the general structure of the criminal law. The basic justification for excusing perpetra-
tors is, in this regard, rooted in the principle of guilt/fault. Those are excluded from 
responsibility who (at the time of the act) are understood to lack the basic capacity of 
criminally responsible behaviour, and thus cannot be blamed. The more specific justi-
fication for excluding psychotic offenders from responsibility will be explained below. 
It worth noting here that the various grounds for criminal incapacity, in contrast 
to many countries, are all defined by specifying a particular condition—young age, 
unconsciousness, mental retardation, or psychosis—which, when established at the 
time of the offence, lead to unconditional exoneration from criminal responsibility. 
As will be described below, criminal insanity as a matter of psychosis reflects a spe-
cific medical model. It should also be noted that, in Norwegian law, criminal insanity, 
as a matter of mental disorder as an excuse, is separated in the Norwegian regulation 
from incapacity due to mental disability and consciousness impairments. This is dif-
ferent from what is the case in many countries. 
When it comes to evidence, it is the perpetrator’s criminal capacity (and not inca-
pacity) at the time of the offence which much be proven by the prosecution.13 Thus, 
criminal insanity is not constructed as a defence, such as is typically the case in An-
glo-American law. Instead, criminal incapacity and insanity are understood as cir-
cumstances that exempt a defendant from an otherwise wrongful and criminalised 
act, where criminal capacity is the requirement for responsibility. The duty of the 
court is to determine whether the defendant fulfilled this requirement, disregarding 
the defendant’s own view on his/her capacity. As we will return to below, forensic 
experts often have decisive influence on the result of this process of determination.
The general standard of proof is often formulated by stating that ‘any reasonable 
doubt should benefit the defendant’.14 Certain proof and solid persuasion are nec-
12 For a discussion on this exception, see Gröning & Myklebust, ‘Intoxication and self-induced 
criminal incapacity in Norwegian law’, Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 
6(1) (2018) pp. 68–91.
13 Se Ot. Prp. Nr. 11 (1928) p. 5, Rt. 1979 p. 143, and NOU 2014: 10 pp. 185–186. 
14 See Kohlflaath ‘Bevist utover enhver rimelig tvil’, Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap 124(2) (2011) pp. 
135–196 for a discussion about the meaning of this standard of proof. 
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essary. This is the same standard of proof that is enshrined in the legal systems of 
most civilised nations, and it has its ethical roots in a desire to avoid the conviction 
of innocent individuals. The Norwegian Supreme Court has ruled that this general 
standard of proof applies to all preconditions of criminal responsibility, including the 
requirement of criminal capacity. The Supreme Court has, on the other hand, also 
ruled that the same standard of proof cannot be demanded when the determination 
of criminal capacity concerns whether the defendant was insane and psychotic.15 
Which standard of proof applies to this determination is not fully clear. It follows 
from previous judgements that a balance of probability standard is clearly not suffi-
cient, but the higher threshold has not yet been clarified. Many argue, however, that 
the threshold is only slightly lower than the general standard of proof requiring no 
reasonable doubt.16 
Although the court has the ultimate say on whether the perpetrator was psychot-
ic and thus insane at the time of the offence, forensic experts have, in practice, had 
considerable, and often decisive, influence on the result. Typically, the courts refer to 
the evaluations and conclusions from forensic experts in their judgments, and build 
their legal conclusions upon these.17 Forensic experts are appointed by the court, not 
by the parties.18 It is standard that two independent experts are appointed by the 
court. The courts use a standard mandate, composed in collaboration between the 
Prosecutor General, The Court Administration, and the Norwegian Board of Fo-
rensic Medicine.19 Under this mandate the forensic experts are asked to evaluate the 
mental condition of the perpetrator in relation to the psychosis criterion in the Penal 
Code section 20. More specifically, the experts diagnose the defendant following the 
ICD-10 as a basis for the forensic evaluation. On this basis, they will then evaluate 
whether the perpetrator was psychotic at the time of the offence as the Penal Code re-
quires, which also requires a legal understanding of this criterion.20 In order to secure 
a certain quality and provide for a uniform forensic practice, the Norwegian Board 
of Forensic Medicine controls all of these evaluations. The strict standard of proof 
has generally had the result that when the experts unanimously conclude with psy-
chosis, and this is approved by the forensic board, the court follows their conclusion. 
In cases where the experts conclude with sanity but expresses doubt, or when the ex-
15 See for comparison Rt. 1979 p. 143, p. 147; Rt. 1990 p. 586, p. 587; Rt. 1998 p. 1945, p. 1947; Rt. 
2003 p. 23 paragraph 13 and Rt. 2007 p. 1217 paragraph 64.
16 See Gröning, Husabø & Jacobsen (2016) pp. 489–490, Strandbakken, Uskyldspresumsjonen 
‘In dubio pro reo’, (Fagbokforlaget 2003) p. 407, and Løvlie, Rettslige faktabegreper (Gyldendal 
2014) p. 359. 
17 See further below in section 4.2. 
18 It should here be noted that according to Norwegian law, the prosecution has a duty to be 
objective, see Criminal Procedure Act sections 55 and 226. See further Kjelby, Påtalerett 
(Cappelen Damm 2017) pp. 241–257. 
19 See Newsletter no. 22 from the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine for the content of this 
mandate.
20 NOU 1990: 5 p. 42.
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perts conclude different from each other, the court must provide a more independent 
evaluation.21 Our impression is, however, that these cases are less frequent. 
According to section 62 of the Penal Code, the court may decide to commit to 
compulsory psychiatric care an offender who is not accountable pursuant to section 
20 first paragraph letter b. According to the Penal Code, this is a ‘special criminal sanc-
tion’ that is not punishment. Section 62 regulates two different forms of such compul-
sory care: one that is time unlimited (and can be prolonged as long as there is a risk 
that the offender may commit new serious crimes) and one that is time limited to a 
maximum of three years for offenders who commit less serious offences. The risk eval-
uation is made on the background of forensic expert evaluations, where the offender’s 
conduct, illness progression, and mental functional capacity are central aspects.22
3. The Medical Model: Background and Justifications 
The medical model for the definition of criminal insanity is characterised by identi-
fying insanity with some form of mental disorder exclusively. Under section 20 first 
paragraph, letter b of the Criminal Code, a defendant who is psychotic at the time of 
the act is absolved from criminal responsibility. This rule does not operate with any 
criteria requiring that the disorder affected the defendant’s cognitive or control ca-
pacities with regard to the commission of the crime. 
This current medical model with the psychosis criterion was introduced into sec-
tion 44 of the former 1902 Penal Code by an amendment in 1997 that entered into 
force in 2002.23 However, the practice of using a medical model in Norwegian law 
significantly predates this. Already, the 1842 Criminal Code was to a certain extent 
built upon a medical model, and it was fully established in 1929 when the 1902 Penal 
Code was revised.24 In the earlier version of the rule, however, the legal criteria for 
insanity was ‘sinnssyk’, which translates precisely as ‘insane’. This criterion then also 
included mental retardation of high degree and serious instances of autism spectrum 
disorders. Through the 1997 amendment, this criterion was removed, and was split 
into the two new criteria that today are specified in section 20 letter b and c—’psy-
21 See further below in section 4.2. 
22 See further in Mindestrømmen, ‘Impending Danger: The Meaning of Danger as a Legal 
Requirement for Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment in the Norwegian Criminal Justice System’,  
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 7(1) 2019, pp 110-135; Holst, ‘Court-
Ordered Compulsory Psychiatric Care and the Prosecutor’s Control Function’, Bergen Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 7(1) 2019, pp 136-147.
23 Lov 17. januar 1997 no. 11. See Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993-1994) Om lov om endringer i straffeloven 
m.v. (strafferettslige utilregenlighetsregler og særreaksjoner) for the justifications for this 
amendment. 
24 See Skålevåg, Utilregnelighet: En historie om rett og medisin (Pax Forlag 2016) for the historical 
development of the medical model in Norway. 
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chotic’ and ‘mentally retarded to high degree’. An unintended, but problematic result 
of this change was that those with severe autism spectrum disorders now apparently 
fell outside the scope of the rule. The rule with the psychosis criterion was retained 
without changes in section 20 in the current 2005 Penal Code. 
This rule has not been subject to much attention until the criminal case in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attack in the centre of Oslo and on Utøya on 22 July 2011 
triggered a wide-ranging discussion about its adequacy. With this discussion as 
backdrop, a law commission was appointed to investigate the need for changes. This 
commission proposed in NOU 2014:10 to preserve the medical model, though in a 
considerably watered-down form that also includes ‘conditions that are equated with 
psychosis’.25 This proposal was, however, not followed by the Norwegian Ministry 
of Justice and Public Security, who delivered Prop. 154 L (2016–2017) in June 2017. 
The Ministry proposed, instead, a rule that removes the psychosis criterion and re-
places it with a criterion that requires that the defendant was ‘insane due to serious 
mental disorder’ in order to be absolved from responsibility.26 The intention, similar 
to that of the law commission, was to introduce a criterion that makes it possible 
to include other conditions than psychosis, provided that they are serious enough, 
while retaining psychosis as the central condition for excuse.27 At the same time, the 
proposed rule allows for significant judicial discretion in regard to defining the more 
specific legal cut-off point.28 Particularly for this reason, the proposal from the Min-
istry has been widely criticised. The majority of the Justice committee in the parlia-
ment shared this critical view, and recommended that the proposal was sent back to 
the Ministry for further consideration.29 However, the minority that recommended 
that the Ministry’s proposal was enacted consisted of representatives for the political 
parties in the government. These political parties have majority in the Parliament. 
Therefore, the voting in the Parliament was in favour of the proposal, with 52 against 
46 votes. Accordingly, there will be a law reform. In any case, this law reform will not 
change the core characteristics of the medical model tradition in Norway; that men-
tal disorder is sufficient for insanity. Although the word ‘psychotic’ will be removed, 
insanity will still be determined only in relation to the severity of the defendant’s 
mental disorder. The severity of a psychosis will still remain central.30
25 The proposed rule was that ‘A person whom the court deems to have been psychotic at 
the time of committing the act or in a condition which—due to reduced functioning, 
disordered thinking, or otherwise to the inability to comprehend their relationship with their 
surroundings—must be equated with psychosis, is free from criminal responsibility.’ See 
further Gröning & Rieber Mohn (2015).
26 For a commentary on this proposal, see Gröning (2017). See also Gröning & Myklebust (2018).
27 Prop. 154 L (2016–2017) pp. 64–70. 
28 It should be mentioned that psychopathy is explicitly excluded from the sphere of relevant 
conditions, see Prop 154 L (2016–2017) p. 13 and pp. 76–77. See also NOU 2014: 10 p. 130.
29 See Innst. 296 L (2018-2019) pp 3–4 and pp. 8–9. 
30 See Prop. 154 L (2016–2017) pp. 13 and 69, and Innst. 296 L (2018-2019) pp 3–4.
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Why has Norway established such a unique medical model? The medical model is 
often understood as an expression of the view that the impact of a mental disorder 
on the crime is irrelevant in Norwegian law. This is true if the focus is only on the 
court evaluation. However, the medical model was (and still is) most of all justified 
by arguments about legal certainty and an adequate functional division between the 
legislator and the courts. In the preparatory works it is stated that deciding the ques-
tion of exemption from punishment should depend as little as possible on the judge’s 
own discretion. Conditions of criminal insanity must be therefore be described in 
terminology that is recognised in psychiatric science.31 This focus on legal certainty 
is generally strong in Norwegian criminal law.32 
Furthermore, at the legislative level, it is precisely the view that psychosis impacts 
in a certain way on the perpetrator’s capacity for responsible behaviour that has been 
a primary justification. Generally, justifications for punishment in Norwegian law 
emphasise that criminal responsibility presupposes that the perpetrator has had a 
choice of (more than one) action and can be blamed for the choice taken. It is here 
the principle of guilt/fault that is the primary foundation: that only those that could 
and should have acted differently, and therefore can be blamed, should be held re-
sponsible and punished. Certain offenders must, however, be deemed to be in such 
a confused and abnormal state of mind at the time of the offence that they should 
not be held accountable for their actions. Offenders who were ‘psychotic’ at the time 
of the offence, and with a pronounced intensity of psychotic symptoms have, in this 
regard, been assumed to lack this capacity for responsible behaviour.33 In addition to 
this guilt-based justification for the psychosis criterion, crime prevention is empha-
sised as another purpose of law. The view is typically that there is no benefit from 
holding liable those who are in such a confused and abnormal state of mind. The 
criminal justice system’s regulating effect on behaviour—that is, its ability to induce 
members of the public to obey the law through deterrence and the formation of 
norms—is not weakened by absolving these persons of criminal responsibility.34 
The establishment of the medical model must, however, also be understood in 
light of the development of psychiatry in Norway and its influence on the legal un-
derstanding of insanity.35 The development of the medical model in Norway was sur-
rounded by an atmosphere of scientific optimism, and the belief that insanity could 
be identified by psychiatry, through scientific methods.36   
31 See, inter alia, Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993–1994) p. 28. 
32 See Gröning, Husabø & Jacobsen (2016).
33 See NOU 2014: 10 p. 111. 
34 See NOU 2014: 10 pp. 85–86. See also Gröning & Rieber Mohn (2015), p. 113. 
35 For an explanation of the historical development of the medical model, see Skålevåg (2016) 
and Skålevåg, ‘Sykdom og tilregnelighet – fra sakkyndighetens historie’, Tidsskrift for norsk 
legeforening 122(1) (2002) pp. 65–68. 
36 See Skålevåg (2016).
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 4. The Understanding of Psychosis in Law and Legal Practice 
4.1 Explanations in the Legal Sources 
Let us then take a closer look at how the psychosis criterion has been explained in 
the legal sources. In the preparatory works, the Ministry of Justice provides the fol-
lowing explanation that has been cited in many court cases and discussed in the 
literature:
‘When considering the type of conditions to be considered as psychoses in the sense of the 
Penal Code, decisive importance must be attached to the way in which psychiatry at any 
given time defines the concept of psychosis. Today, psychiatrists agree that the principal 
characteristic of a psychosis is that the relationship to reality is significantly disturbed. 
The ability to react adequately to ordinary impressions and influences is lacking. The 
psychotic person often loses control over his thoughts, emotions and actions. Intellectual 
functions, on the contrary, may be intact. The dividing line between psychosis and other 
mental disorders is not sharp.’37
This quotation provides the general understanding of the law’s psychosis criterion, 
but also highlights some controversial points. To begin with the uncontested, psy-
chosis constituting criminal insanity is in accordance with the medical conception of 
impaired reality testing, and more specifically of significantly impaired reality testing.38 
What matters to the law is, in this regard, that the perpetrator was psychotic at the 
time of the offence. 
In order to understand the law properly, we must here consider the distinction 
between psychosis-symptoms, psychosis as state, and psychotic disorders. Psychotic dis-
orders are classified according to descriptive, consensus-based, diagnostic manuals. 
The two major manuals are the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders (currently in its fifth edition, DSM-5) from the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion,39 and the international classification system for mental disorders (currently in 
its tenth version, ICD-10) from the World Health Organization, the latter of which is 
used in the Norwegian forensic context.40 Psychosis symptoms are signs that indicate 
(a state or a disorder of) psychosis. As we will return to, neither the ICD-10 or the 
DSM-5 have a formal definition of the term psychosis.41 Instead, the DSM-5 defines 
‘psychotic features’ as ‘features characterised by delusions, hallucinations, and formal 
37 See inter alia, Ot.prp. no. 87 (1993–1994) p. 22, Rt. 2008 p. 549 section 33, and Gröning, 
Husabø & Jacobsen (2016) pp. 494–497.
38 This will also be the case under the proposed new rule, see Innst. 296 L (2018-2019) pp. 2–3. 
39 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th 
Edition: DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Publishing 2013).
40 World Health Organization, The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: 
Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines (World Health Organization 1992).
41 See below in section 9. 
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thought disorder’, and in the ICD-10 the term ‘psychotic’ describes ‘the presence of 
hallucinations, delusions, or a limited number of severe abnormalities of behaviour, 
such as gross excitement and overactivity, marked psychomotor retardation, and 
catatonic behaviour’. These features are generally understood as psychosis symptoms. 
Psychosis as a state amounts essentially to impaired reality testing, and it is this as-
pect that is relevant to law. As there is a lack of a definition of psychosis, it is also 
unclear how impaired reality testing should be understood. It is, however, common 
to interpret the law’s psychosis criterion as a requirement that the psychosis must be 
discernible at the time of the offence through obvious symptoms. As we will return 
to, this relation between symptoms and impaired reality testing is complex.42
Disregarding this complexity, it is clear that the legal criterion requires that the 
perpetrator was in an (active) state of psychosis at the time of the act. It is, therefore, 
not sufficient for the perpetrator to have a diagnosis of a psychotic disorder, such as 
schizophrenia. A person who suffers from a psychotic disorder and receives effective 
medication, or is otherwise in better health due to natural fluctuation in psychosis 
symptoms, may not be psychotic at the time of the offence. If this is the case, he/she 
is not criminally insane according to Norwegian criminal law.43 
Although generally acknowledged, the distinction between having a diagnosis of 
a psychotic disorder, and being psychotic at the time of the offence has resulted in 
some confusion in the legal discourse.44 When the psychosis criterion was enacted 
it was suggested by the Special Sanctions Committee that the rule should specify 
that ‘A person who was psychotic at the time of committing the act and hence unable 
to make a realistic assessment of his relationship to the surrounding world [emphasis 
added] shall not be liable to a penalty.’45 The Ministry, however, did not support this 
proposed specification, with the justification that:
‘It must be expected that persons who are to practice this provision, i.e., lawyers with the 
help of psychiatrists, are aware of the characteristics of a psychotic state. For them, any 
specification is unnecessary. However, people in general probably know little about the 
characteristics of a psychosis. But for them, a specification would, in the Ministry’s view, 
be confusing rather than informative, since it is conceivable that there are psychotic of-
fenders who, to a greater or lesser degree, have the ability to make realistic assessments.’46 
42 See below in section 9. 
43 In this regard, Norwegian law operates with a relatively high threshold for criminal insanity. As 
a comparative example, the Danish criminal insanity rule includes those with a diagnosis of a 
psychotic disorder, and there is no equivalent requirement of seriousness, See further Kamber, 
‘Psykisk syge lovovertrædere i et komparativt lys’, Nordisk tidsskrift for kriminalvidenskab 
100(3) (2013) pp. 358–368. 
44 See, inter alia, Rosenqvist ‘Utilregnelighetsregelen – moden for revisjon?’, Tidsskrift for den 
Norske Legeforening 132(7) (2012) pp. 843–844.
45 NOU 1990: 5 p. 38 and p. 51. 
46 Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993–1994) p. 28.
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In our view, the proposed specification should have been enacted, as it makes it clear 
that having a diagnosis is not sufficient to fulfil the legal criterion.
A more complicated matter is how it should be interpreted that the legal psycho-
sis criterion requires a significantly impaired reality testing. In the preparatory works 
it is explained that the offender’s lack of ability to make a realistic assessment of his 
relationship to the surrounding world must be relatively general, i.e., the impairment 
must include significant aspects of reality for the offender to be declared psychotic.47 
On the other hand, an all-encompassing failure of the ability to assess reality is not 
necessarily required. A flawed perception of reality in a limited sector may, for the 
patient, assume such dimensions and have such consequences for his relationship to 
the surrounding world that it would be correct to evaluate him as psychotic. 
However, this explanation does not fully clarify what impaired reality testing 
amounts to; for instance, to what extent and in what way it involves quantitative and/
or qualitative dimensions of psychopathology. Another challenge is whether the le-
gal cut-off point for being psychotic should be understood as stricter compared to 
the clinical one. In the literature, and also in forensic practice that we will look at 
below, it is argued that the legal criterion requires the psychotic state to be of a cer-
tain seriousness. This means that a dimensional perspective is taken, implying that it 
is possible to quantify impaired reality testing in terms of more or less psychotic. We 
will return to this matter and discuss whether and how this legal cut-off point can be 
operationalised from a medical research point of view.48 
4.2 The Interpretation of the Psychosis Criterion in Legal Judgments 
In criminal insanity cases it is the court that has the final say about whether a de-
fendant is psychotic and should be absolved from responsibility. This question is 
then answered through the application of the psychosis criterion in individual cases, 
which involves interpretation of its legal meaning. Generally, however, the courts do 
not provide any further clarification of the legal meaning of the psychosis criterion 
other than what follows from the preparatory works. What is more, the courts to a 
significant extent rely on forensic experts and justify their legal conclusions through 
clinical and diagnostic evaluations.49 Therefore, the courts’ legal argumentation 
about insanity is in most cases full of medical language, and hinges largely upon 
psychiatric diagnoses and symptoms. The typical structure of the legal reasoning is 
the following. First, the evaluations of the experts and other (medical) witnesses are 
described. These provide a diagnosis of the defendant, and an explanation of the ob-
47 See NOU 1990: 5 p. 38. See also NOU 2014:10 p. 49 and Prop. 154 L. (2016-2017) p. 21. 
48 See below in section 9 and 10. 
49 This is based upon an investigation of all published judgments between 01.01.2013–01.11.2018, 
see https://lovdata.no.
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served symptoms and dysfunctions. On this basis they also conclude on the question 
of psychosis and impaired reality testing at the time of the offence. After describing 
these expert evaluations, the court typically gives its verdict, briefly stating that the 
defendant was/was not psychotic according to section 20 first section letter b of the 
Penal Code.
Reading criminal insanity judgments often leaves one wondering how the court 
found its way from the diagnostic evaluation of the offender, to the legal conclusion 
about psychosis and insanity.
In cases where there is disagreement between the experts, the courts provide a 
more independent evaluation. However, the courts in these cases typically do not 
provide any clarification of the legal cut-off points for psychosis amounting to crimi-
nal insanity. Instead, the focus is on reviewing the medical statements of the experts. 
The well-known Breivik case provides an illustrative example, although it contained 
an unusually long evaluation from the court. In this case, two pairs of experts con-
cluded differently about his diagnosis and sanity; the first pair of experts evaluat-
ed him as psychotic, and the second pair evaluated him as non-psychotic.50 A main 
point of controversy was whether Breivik’s beliefs were an expression of grandiose 
delusions present in schizophrenia or extreme beliefs indicating his terrorist motiva-
tion. The court agued, inter alia, that: 
‘The defendant has in a fanatical and cynical manner maintained that the selection of 
victims and object for his misdeeds on 22 July 2011 was politically motivated. It is dif-
ficult for the Court to see that his conceptions of murders and terrorist acts to attain a 
future political goal—regardless how incomprehensible and reproachable they may be—
can be “completely impossible”, which is how this diagnostic criterion is normally applied 
according to information at hand. [...]
The activities described above show that the defendant had stamina, impulse control 
and good cognitive functions related to the tasks he assigned himself. The Court finds the 
defendant’s ability to plan and implement in these various areas hard to reconcile with 
untreated paranoid schizophrenia with a gradual deterioration from 2006.’51
The court finally concluded that Breivik was sane, mainly by showing that he did not 
have psychotic symptoms fulfilling an ICD-10 diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. 
As is typical in insanity cases, this link between diagnostic categories and legal stan-
dards was not clarified or justified. In addition, the judgement was based on faulty 
statements about the relevant disorders, for instance that Breivik’s ability to plan his 
acts was hard to reconcile with schizophrenia.52 
50 See Oslo District Court, TOSLO–2011–1888627–24 (RG–2012–1153), available in English 
at http://lovdata.no/info/information_in_english. See also, Melle ‘The Breivik case and what 
psychiatrists can learn from it’, World Psychiatry 12(1) (2013) pp. 16–21.
51 See Oslo District Court, TOSLO–2011–1888627–24 (RG–2012–1153) p. 56. 
52 Dahl, ‘Erklæringer og dom i 22 juli saken – hva kan vi lære?’, Tidsskrift for Den norske 
legeforening 133(12/13) (2013) pp. 1289–1290.
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It should here be noted that in some cases where the experts found that the defen-
dant is not psychotic, the court concludes differently from the experts even when the 
experts agree with each other. Most often, however, the court then justifies its dis-
agreement with the experts with reference to the strict standard of proof, and the fact 
that the experts’ conclusion raises too much doubt about the defendant’s condition. 
There are also a few examples in the case law of the court emphasising the weight of 
evidence other than the expert evaluation in its reasoning. In some of these cases, 
the court—or at least some members of it—may disagree with the forensic experts 
on the basis of other evidence, such as witness reports about the defendant’s mental 
condition. In other cases, the court may agree with the experts’ medical conclusion, 
but also emphasise these other sources of evidence as a basis for their own legal con-
clusion.53 Nevertheless, the courts in these cases typically do not provide any legal 
clarification of the cut-off point for insanity. It seems, in fact, somewhat unpredict-
able which aspects of the evidence about the defendant’s condition the courts choose 
to emphasise as the bases for their verdict. Sometimes the courts point to the nature 
of the defendant’s symptoms, such as hallucinations and delusions, but without fur-
ther clarification, whereas at other times witness descriptions or the defendant’s own 
explanations about his actions are emphasised.     
In sum, court practice does not provide for further clarification of the psychosis 
criterion, or for what is required for an impaired reality testing to be serious enough 
to fulfil this criterion. Is it a matter of diagnoses, or of symptoms? And, if the latter, 
which symptoms? In order to seek a clearer understanding of the legal meaning of 
psychosis, we will now take a look at the operationalisation of the psychosis criterion 
in forensic practice.
5. The Understanding of Psychosis in Forensic Practice 
The predominant role of forensic practice is to assist the court (and the prosecutors) 
with medical evaluations of whether the defendant was psychotic at the time of the 
offence, with a significantly impaired reality testing. The forensic evaluation will in 
this regard tie the legal psychosis criterion to an underlying medical conceptualisa-
tion of the severity of the psychosis. From the law’s perspective, this link between the 
legal criterion and the medical concept of psychosis is, as we have explained above, 
understood to secure legal certainty.54 The tacit presumption is that forensic prac-
tice can provide a sufficiently clear and uniform understanding of psychosis and im-
paired reality testing that may provide the law with a clear cut-off point for insanity. 
53 See Judgment from Gulating Lagmansrett 19.11.2015 (LG-2015-60583), Judgment from 
Borgarting lagmansrett 17.06.2013 (LB-2013-58668) and Judgment from Halden tingrett 
22.03.2018 (THALD-2017-172135). 
54 See section 3 above. 
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However, this is not necessarily the case. There is no clear and uniform understand-
ing about what impaired reality testing amounts to in forensic practice. Rather, the 
forensic field is characterised by a significant diversity in perspectives, which is also 
related to an underlying diversity in ordinary clinical practice. The high degree of 
institutional autonomy in Norway, where mental health institutions are often also 
geographically separated, may allow for ‘local diagnostic schools’.55 This was also a 
main reason for the establishment of the National Board of Forensic Medicine that is 
understood to contribute a more consistent forensic practice. 
A remaining core challenge is, however, the focus on criteria-based diagnostics. 
When forensic experts evaluate a defendant, they first establish a diagnosis based on 
the criteria listed in the ICD-10 manual.56 This is to provide a more transparent basis 
for the clinical (and the following legal) evaluation.57 As we will return to, an overt 
focus on diagnostic criteria may, however, shadow the legally relevant assessment of 
the person’s ability to understand reality. A person may, as we have described, have 
symptoms and signs sufficient for a diagnosis of a psychotic disorder (following the 
ICD-10), without having a significantly distorted perception of reality as the law re-
quires. The focus on ICD-10 as a basis for expert evaluations also seems to link crim-
inal insanity to diagnostic categories, and to specific diagnoses. Paranoid schizophre-
nia is, in this regard, by far the most frequent diagnosis where Norwegian experts 
conclude that the defendant was psychotic and criminally insane.58 At the same time, 
the ICD-10 does not provide a clear definition of what it means to be psychotic and 
reality distorted, but focuses on symptoms that are part of psychotic disorders.59 Psy-
chiatrists and psychologists have therefore problematised the use of ICD-10 (and 
DSM) in clinical and forensic psychiatric practice. A main concern has also been 
that the diagnostic systems mainly focus on easily recognisable symptoms, not on 
the person’s subjective experience of themselves and how they interpret the world 
55 See Nordgaard, Jessen, Sæbye & Parnas, ‘Variability in clinical diagnoses during the ICD-8 
and ICD-10 era’, Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 2016 for an investigation into 
diagnostic variation in Denmark. 
56 This practice was established through a newsletter from the National Board of Forensic 
Medicine in February 2004 that provided a distinct recommendation that every person 
observed should be diagnosed according to the criteria in ICD-10. See newsletter no. 10, 
available at http://www.sivilrett.no/nyhetsbrev.339568.no.html.
57 A curiosity is here that the Danish forensic board has chosen to keep ICD-8 as a standard since 
the old system is more easily compatible with the Danish judicial system.
58 See, inter alia, Callahan, Steadman, McGreevy & Robbins, ‘The volume and characteristics of 
insanity defense pleas: an eight-state study’, Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and 
the Law 19(4) (1991) pp. 331–338, and Perlin, ‘The Insanity Defense: Nine Myths that Will 
not Go Away’, in White, MD (ed.), The Insanity Defense: Multidisciplinary Views on its History, 
Trends and Controversies (Praeger 2017). 
59 See Kvig & Nilssen, ‘Epistemologi og psykiatriske diagnoser: nødvendigheten av en 
fenomenologisk forståelse av psykotisk bevissthet’, Tidsskrift for Norsk psykologforening 51(9) 
(2014) pp. 729–737 and Melle ‘Rettspsykiatriske vurderinger’, in Aarli, Hedlund & Jebens 
(eds.), Bevis i straffesaker: Utvalgte emner (Gyldendal 2015) p. 665. 
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around them—such as a phenomenological approach allows for. Thus, by focusing on 
signs and symptoms the experts may overlook other hallmarks of a psychotic state: 
that the perpetrator only manages to view himself and his surroundings from the 
first-person perspective (egocentric perspective) and lacks (or has lost) the ability to 
take any other perspective than their own.60
In our understanding, there is no conflict between using the modern criteria-ori-
ented diagnostic symptoms and taking such a subjective-oriented phenomenolog-
ical approach. Although the forensic experts are required to diagnose according to 
ICD-10, they are also, to a certain extent, required to embrace a phenomenological 
perspective. From such a perspective, impaired reality testing is in essence concep-
tualised as an understanding of reality that isn’t shared by others in the population 
to which the person belongs (in-group). In other words, the person’s understanding 
of reality is idiosyncratic. Although such a phenomenological perspective may come 
closer to grasping what impaired reality testing is about, it is not operationalised in 
clear clinical (or legal) cut-off points in forensic practice. Hence, there is no uniform 
understanding—or, even less, guidelines—securing transparency and equal treat-
ment. This lack of clear cut-off points is reflected in the challenges to prove that a 
defendant was (sufficiently) psychotic at the time of the act, which, as we shall now 
explain, ultimately amounts to a discretion-based assessment. 
6. Identifying Psychosis in Forensic Practice
6.1 Central Perspectives and Approaches 
According to the standard mandate from the court or the prosecutor, the forensic 
experts are asked to evaluate whether the defendant was psychotic according to the 
Penal Code, i.e., whether the defendant’s capacity for reality testing was significantly 
impaired at the time of the offence(s) or not. In order to fulfil this mandate, the ex-
perts have to seek knowledge about the defendant’s state of mind. Basically, there are 
two sources for such knowledge: information from the defendant himself, and inter-
pretations of his state of mind by other observers, based upon their observations of 
and contact with him.61 It is crucial to assess the person’s own views, and the clinical 
interview is thus central in the experts’ work. The experts must also use information 
from other sources, such as documents from the police, the correctional services, or 
60 For a comment on the focus on signs and symptoms in the assessment of psychopathology, see 
Nelson, Parnas & Sass, ‘Disturbance of Minimal Self (Ipseity) in Schizophrenia: Clarification 
and Current Status’, Schizophrenia Bulletin 40(3) (2014) pp. 479–482. See also Sass & Parnas, 
‘Schizophrenia, Conciousness, and the Self ’, Schizophrenia Bulletin 29(3) (2003) pp. 427–444. 
61 See Andenæs, Alminnelig strafferett, 6th ed., by Rieber Mohn & Sæter (Universitetsforlaget 
2016), p. 240.
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the health system. If the defendant refuses to cooperate, the forensic evaluation will 
be based solely upon this secondary information.62 
Apart from the requirement that ICD-10 should be used, there are no unified 
diagnostic guidelines for Norwegian forensic practice. Diagnostic tools—such as the 
structured Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI)63—that are rou-
tinely used in Norwegian psychiatric services for screening for psychiatric illnesses 
are also used by some forensic experts. The problem with these tools, however, is that 
they can be used to obtain a life-time diagnosis of a mental disorder, but little or no 
guidelines about the severity of the impairment which is understood to be central 
to law. In order to measure disorder severity, the diagnostic tools can be combined 
with rating scales. For instance, the Montgomery Asheim Depression Rating Scale 
(MADRS)64 may be used to characterise the depth of a depression, the Young Mania 
Rating Scale (YMRS)65 may be used to measure the height of a manic episode, and 
the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS)66 may be used to chart the sever-
ity of a psychotic episode. It is noteworthy that these structured symptom mapping 
tools/interviews can only be used after a diagnosis has been established, in order to 
distinguish between different degrees of a symptom. These severity rating scales may 
be criticised for being a mechanical summing up of signs and symptoms. On the 
other hand, the rating scales can contribute to a more transparent clinical evaluation 
from the legal point of view, and improve the opportunity for the judge to examine 
and overrule the conclusions from the experts. 
Determining the severity of a person’s psychosis requires an experienced forensic 
expert who knows how to make persons with impaired reality testing expose this 
lack or shortage in ability during the interview. Central in this evaluation is the ques-
tion of whether the perpetrator’s beliefs, thoughts and behaviour are signs of a dis-
ordered relation to reality. Imagine, for instance, a person that expresses an opinion 
of being persecuted by the police, and where the forensic experts must evaluate if 
this is probable or not. The person is a criminal. The police are supposed to monitor 
the criminal population. A central task in deciding whether this belief is a sign of 
62 In case of refusal to meet the forensic experts, the Criminal Procedure Act section 166 second 
paragraph allows the police to bring the person to the forensic experts, but the person doesn’t 
have to cooperate. The Criminal Procedure Act section 167 regulates compulsory psychiatric 
hospital admission for observation.
63 Sheehan, Lecrubier, Sheehan, et al. ‘The Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview 
(M.I.N.I.): the development and validation of a structured diagnostic psychiatric interview for 
DSM-IV and ICD-10’, Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 59(20) (1998) pp. 22–33.
64 Montgomery & Asberg, ‘A new depression scale designed to be sensitive to change’, British 
Journal of Psychiatry 134(4) (1979) pp. 382–89.
65 Young, Biggs, Ziegler & Meyer ‘A rating scale for mania: reliability, validity and sensitivity’, 
British Journal of Psychiatry 133(5) (1978) pp. 429–35.
66 Kay et al. ‘The positive and negative syndrome scale (PANSS) for schizophrenia’, Schizophrenia 
Bulletin 13(2) (1987) pp. 261–276.
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impaired reality testing is the exploration of why the person thinks the police are af-
ter him. What does the perpetrator think the police’s motives are? How does he/she 
know or suspect that the police are persecuting him? And, are there other symptoms 
or signs of a psychotic disorder?
Or, imagine a person belonging to a subgroup of fundamental Christians, who 
believes that he communicates directly with God and is convinced that God still 
sends prophets to earth. In the conversations with the forensic experts, he explains 
that his religious beliefs are in accordance with the rest of his congregation. He is 
utterly convinced that he is a prophet even when he is told that no one else in the 
congregation believes that. The other congregation members say that he has a serious 
drug dependency and finances his substance abuse by committing crimes, which is 
not consistent with being a prophet. He, however, rejects this view entirely and main-
tains, without any signs of doubt, that the others in the congregation will eventually 
change their minds. These examples show that impaired reality testing needs to be 
identified through comprehensive clinical evaluations that not only consist of iden-
tifying obvious psychosis symptoms, but that also integrate phenomenological and 
diagnostic perspectives. 
Sometimes the impaired reality testing is strikingly obvious even for an unedu-
cated person. In such cases, one might argue that the court has little use for forensic 
experts, apart from reducing the risk of being fooled by an individual merely simu-
lating these symptoms. However, many cases are not that obvious, and the evalua-
tion has to involve a certain degree of uncertainty. This requires competent expert 
interviews and evaluations. There are also certain specific challenges and reasons for 
uncertainty that we will now take a closer look at. 
6.2 The Challenge of the Time Gap from Criminal Act to Forensic Evaluation
A specific challenge for the forensic experts (and for the judges) is the time compo-
nent. The psychotic condition must be present at the time of the offence, but is always 
evaluated in retrospect—often months later, and under markedly different condi-
tions and degree of subjective discomfort than at the time of the offence(s). When 
a crime has been committed it is therefore always important to have a psychiatric 
examination as close to the time of the incident as possible. In Norway, this can be 
achieved through a preliminary examination at the request of the police.67 Such a 
preliminary psychiatric examination close to the time of the incident may be a vital 
premise for the subsequent and more thorough psychiatric evaluation. 
Nevertheless, the forensic evaluation must emphasise what the defendant tells 
about him/herself at the time of the offence. The experts must explain to the person 
observed that it is what he/she thought and felt at the time of action that is central, 
67 See the Criminal Procedure Act, p. 165 fourth paragraph. 
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that he/she has to distinguish between what they thought then, afterthoughts, what 
he/she has read, has been told, has reasoned about in retrospect, and what he/she 
thinks today. If the examined person has developed a reality-based distance to his or 
her delusions it can help experts to get a clearer picture of the degree of lack of reality 
testing at the time of the offence(s). The longer the period of time between the event 
and the examination, the greater the uncertainty. This uncertainty in evaluating the 
defendant’s state of mind in retrospect must be properly understood and communi-
cated by the experts. 
Since psychosis symptoms may fluctuate in severity over time, a person suffering 
from a psychotic disorder may move in and out of a state of being psychotic. The ex-
pression of mental states may be affected by internal and external stress such as phys-
ical fatigue, physical illness, lack of sleep, drug use, outwardly induced and/or inner 
emotional stress. How psychotic a person appears in a situation may, therefore, vary 
depending on a number of external and internal factors. A person can switch from 
being clearly psychotic in one situation, to appearing to hold a reality-based distance 
to their deviant ideas and experiences in a different situation.
Moreover, recovery may have occurred as a result of adequate and good treat-
ment, no substance abuse, etc. Or the opposite, a deterioration of the illness may 
have occurred due to the fact that the disorder has developed further in a negative 
direction, continuation of drug use, etc. In some acute psychotic disorders with an 
affective component—typically in psychotic mania— symptoms and signs may fluc-
tuate and vary considerably. At the time of the observation, the perpetrator has usu-
ally ‘landed’ (is in remission) from the manic state, or has developed a depressive 
episode. Therefore, at the time of the observation, there may be no clear psychotic 
symptoms. This stands in contrast to cases when the defendant suffers from schizo-
phrenia or delusional disorder with more stable psychosis symptoms that are not 
linked to their affective state.
6.3 The Challenge of Detecting Subtle Psychosis Symptoms 
Persons with a psychosis may, for several reasons, want to hide their symptoms. A 
typical example is a psychotic person who has a comprehensive paranoid system but 
is afraid of telling about his or her thoughts/ideas due to the fear that, if they tell 
about them, they may endanger themselves or anybody else they care about. Foren-
sic experts then need to examine thoroughly for signs that may indicate psychosis 
and impaired reality testing, such as eccentric behaviour or a fall in mental, social, 
and occupational function. A slow and gradual fall in function is often obvious in 
retrospect. When the forensic experts observe indications of a probable or possible 
psychotic disorder, they must critically evaluate each sign or symptom, whilst at the 
same time trying to avoid seeing something that isn’t there, and to avoid interpreting 
each sign and symptom as caused by something else. There may be many reasons 
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for overlooking indistinct symptoms. For instance, thought disorders are considered 
to be core features of a psychotic state related to schizophrenia, but they are also 
frequently overlooked and interpreted as something else. They may be described in 
everyday language, without being clearly conceptualised as psychiatric symptoms. 
The person is, for instance, ‘vague’, ‘answers besides the question’, ‘never reaches the 
point’, or ‘gives confusing answers’. 
In forensic settings, the fear of being manipulated by a perpetrator can, in ad-
dition, lead to mistrust. A possible consequence might be that the forensic expert 
doesn’t believe that the signs or clues are due of a genuine psychotic disorder. In 
order to recognise subtle psychosis symptoms, the expert must alternately focus on 
the whole picture, the patterns, the persons subjective experiences of the psychotic 
illness, but also on each one of the symptoms and signs. Sometimes rating scales can 
be helpful in describing in a more valid and reliable way what’s been observed. When 
it comes to thought disorders, TALD68 can be helpful in naming concepts that are 
hard to catch. 
The retrospective evaluation is further complicated if the person is capable of dis-
simulating, for example by not exposing the delusions motivating their acts, or by 
giving some kind of credible explanation as to why they acted the way they did. Usu-
ally, some signs can give guidance as to how credible the person’s explanation is. A 
specific problem for forensic experts is that evaluation of evidence is the court’s sole 
responsibility. When the experts nevertheless have to involve an assessment of the 
facts in their evaluation, before the court has concluded, they always have to make 
the reservation that the court may assess the facts differently. This may for instance 
be the case when the experts perceive that a person has acted on delusions, and that 
the person’s own explanation in retrospect is a misdirection, but the court may con-
clude with the opposite. The danger of simulation and symptom aggravation at the 
time of the offence(s) is also a possibility, although experience indicates that, in real-
ity, dissimulation is a much greater problem.
7. Intermediate Conclusions: Vagueness and Practical Problems 
To draw some intermediate conclusions from the previous sections, it is clear that 
there are challenges tied both to the definition of psychosis, as a criterion for crimi-
nal insanity, and to proving the relevant state of psychosis. As regards the challeng-
es of definition, we have discussed how Norwegian law ties insanity to psychosis as 
a matter of severely impaired reality testing. While it seems clear that a diagnosis 
is not sufficient, it is not so clear how we should understand the legal requirement 
of impaired reality testing, and whether and to what extent the legal requirement 
68 Kircher et al., ‘A rating scale for the assessment of objective and subjective formal Thought and 
Language Disorder (TALD)’, Schizophrenia Research 160(1–3) (2014) pp. 216–221.
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amounts to a higher or different threshold when compared to the clinical evaluation 
of psychosis. In tying itself to a medical concept, the law lacks full concretisation of 
the legal cut-off points for criminal insanity. Although operating with a seemingly 
concrete psychosis criterion, our intermediate conclusion is that the criminal insani-
ty rule in section 20 of the Penal Code is still legally vague. This problem will not be 
solved but will rather be reinforced with the proposed law reform. 
This vagueness is not properly cured in forensic practice. Rather, this practice 
seems to suffer from the same vagueness problem as the law, and there is a lack of a 
uniform understanding of what is required for being psychotic, and how such a con-
dition may be proved. The forensic experts operate with a large amount of discretion 
where the conclusion about the defendant’s reality testing depends on an overall clin-
ical assessment. There are no clear guidelines for evaluating whether the defendant 
lacks reality testing to a degree the law requires. It is also unclear how symptoms 
matter, and why. Although symptoms may be taken as indicators that a defendant 
lacks reality testing, they are not taken to prove the existence of psychosis. To a cer-
tain extent it rather seems to be the other way around: it is the lack of reality testing 
that is viewed as giving symptoms the quality of psychosis symptoms.
The core questions then remain unanswered: What does it mean to be psychotic? 
What is a significantly impaired reality testing? What is the relation between psy-
chosis and significantly impaired reality testing? Recognising that legal and forensic 
practice do not provide us with clear answers, we will now proceed deeper into the 
medical research perspective in order to seek for further clarifications.
 
8. Adding a Medical Research Perspective: Central Premises
Our discussion so far has made it clear that the criminal insanity rules derive their 
meaning not only from law, but also from psychiatry. This hybrid character of criminal 
insanity regulation and practice is not unique to Norway. In fact, the legal doctrine of 
criminal insanity must be understood as a fundamental legal doctrine that is anchored 
in certain basic normative claims found in most legal orders.69 More specifically, this 
doctrine is rooted in two fundamental normative claims: that humans generally pos-
sess the capacity for responsible behaviour; and, that mental impairments can hamper 
this capacity. Criminal insanity therefore relies not only on legal and legal-philosoph-
ical premises, but also on empirical premises concerning how mental disorders affect 
the individual. It is in the context of this empirical dimension of criminal insanity that 
the involvement of forensic experts in legal judgments must be understood. 
However, the forensic practice is, as we have discussed, a clinical practice with 
many (and not always clearly articulated) different perspectives on psychosis. Al-
69 See Yeo, ‘The Insanity Defense in the Criminal Laws of the Commonwealths of Nations’, 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2008) pp. 241–263. 
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though this practice is to a certain extent anchored in mental health research, it is 
still a practical field. In this light, a more focused view on mental health research may 
serve to further illuminate the legal relevance of psychosis and how it may be proved. 
It must, however, be kept in mind that there are also many challenges in trying to 
understand legal constructs through a medical research lens. Clearly, medicine has 
other purposes and other terms for classification than law when it comes to defining 
mental states as abnormal. Clinical-empirical studies are often carried out within a di-
agnostic framework70 not developed for legal purposes, but to identify and treat men-
tal disorders. The medical research literature is also extensive and covers many dif-
ferent fields of research, with different perspectives on mental disorders. The field of 
law and neuroscience that has—particularly in the United States—developed into an 
extensive discourse71 is also hampered by philosophical problems, and philosophers 
have challenged neuroscience’s ability to guide the law.72 Bearing these challenges in 
mind, it is our ambition in the following to investigate the potential to gain a clearer 
understanding from medical research of both psychosis and impaired reality testing. 
Perhaps we can draw some insights from this research that can contribute also to a 
clearer legal understanding of psychosis as a core condition for criminal insanity. 
9. Seeking a Definition of Psychosis Through Medical Research 
9.1 Impaired Reality Testing and the Core Symptoms of Psychosis 
Most mental health research in recent decades is based on descriptive consen-
sus-based diagnostic manuals, the DSM and the ICD. Accordingly, looking closely 
into these manuals is an appropriate place to start when asking for a common medical 
understanding of psychosis. However, neither the ICD-10 or the DSM-5 have a formal 
definition of the term psychosis. The DSM-5 defines ‘psychotic features’ as ‘features 
characterised by delusions, hallucinations, and formal thought disorder’,73 and in the 
ICD-10 the term ‘psychotic’ describes ‘the presence of hallucinations, delusions, or a 
or a limited number of severe abnormalities of behaviour, such as gross excitement 
70 Cuthbert, ‘The RDoC framework: facilitating transition from ICD/DSM to dimensional 
approaches that integrate neuroscience and psychopathology’, World Psychiatry 13(1) (2016) 
pp. 28–35.
71 Morse & Roskies, A Primer on Criminal Law and Neuroscience: A Contribution of the Law and 
Neuroscience Project, Supported by the MacArthur Foundation (Oxford University Press 2016), 
and Shen, ‘Law and neuroscience 2.0’, Arizona State Law Journal 48(4) (2016) pp. 1043–86.
72 Morse, ‘Legal insanity in the age of neuroscience’, in Moratti & Patterson (eds.), Legal Insanity 
and the Brain: Science, Law and European courts (Hart Publishing 2016) pp. 239–276, and 
Maoz & Yaffe, ‘What does recent neuroscience tell us about criminal responsibility?’ Journal of 
Law and the Biosciences 3(1) (2016) pp. 120–39. 
73 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2013).
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and overactivity, marked psychomotor retardation, and catatonic behaviour’.74 Al-
though Norwegian forensic practitioners use the ICD-10, most research is conducted 
following the DSM. Hence, in the following we will mostly refer to the DSM. 
The lack of a clear definition of psychosis has led scholars to suggest that reality 
distortion could be a common denominator of psychosis.75 Psychosis symptoms are, 
from this perspective, viewed as signs of such a reality distortion. 
‘If we ask ourselves why symptoms […] are called psychotic, we find that this serves to in-
dicate that we consider them severe, and that we suspect them to signal a loss of contact 
with reality [emphasis added] and/or a lack of insight’.76
Following this line of thought, we will investigate into the three core symptoms— de-
lusions, hallucinations, and thought disturbances—and how these symptoms relate 
to the impaired reality dimension (reality distortion or loss of contact with reality) 
of psychosis. As we will discuss in the following, this relation is not clear cut. The 
psychosis symptoms vary in intensity and associated functional impairment, both 
within and between persons. Moreover, the symptoms are not categorical. They exist 
along a continuum from normal experiences and thought processes to severe psy-
chopathology—they are, in other words, dimensional in character. We must also con-
sider how the objective, operational criteria for mental disorders relate to the subjec-
tive phenomena underpinning the symptoms, as captured by the phenomenological 
approach. The objective criteria-based diagnostics and the subjective qualitative ex-
periences are not contradictory, but rather complementary approaches to describing 
the same clinical phenomena on different levels. In the following, we will use a com-
bined phenomenological and symptom-oriented approach to explore, first, how each 
of the three symptom domains (delusions, hallucinations, and thought disorders) are 
related to impaired reality testing. Then, we will go on to discuss possible medical 
correlates to the legal term ‘significantly impaired reality testing’, alongside attempts 
to prove significantly impaired reality testing in a medical context.
9.2 Impaired Reality Testing and Delusions
Delusions are, according to the DSM-5, defined as ‘fixed beliefs that are not amena-
ble to change in light of conflicting evidence (e.g. persecutory, referential, somatic, 
religious, grandiose). […] The distinction between a delusion and a strongly held idea 
is sometimes difficult to make and depends in part on the degree of conviction with 
which the belief is held despite clear and reasonable contradictory evidence regard-
74 World Health Organization, The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: 
Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines, (World Health Organization 1992).
75 Gaebel & Zielasek, ‘Focus on psychosis’, Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 17(1) (2015) pp. 9–18. 
76 Waters, Blom, Jardri, et al., ‘Auditory hallucinations, not necessarily a hallmark of psychotic 
disorder’, Psychological Medicine 48(4) (2017) pp. 1–8.
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ing its veracity.’77 Scholars have used the definitions ‘uncorrectable beliefs not shared 
by others’ or ‘false representations of reality’,78 and delusions have been characterised 
as ‘alterations in the patient’s subjective framework with its interconnecting perspec-
tives on himself, world, and others.’79 The latter suggests that delusions stem from a 
core psychological disturbance and are of a different quality than false or untrue be-
liefs.80 Delusions may be present in psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia, delu-
sional disorder, and bipolar disorder, but may also appear in disorders not primarily 
classified as psychotic, such as depression, emotionally unstable personality disorder, 
dementia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder.81 That is, delusions are not in them-
selves diagnostic markers of a specific disorder. 
Furthermore, delusions are part of a continuum of beliefs where the most severe 
are considered to be delusions of control, influence, thought broadcasting, and bi-
zarre delusions. These kinds of delusions are the so-called ‘a-criteria’ for a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia and are easy to distinguish from normal beliefs. However, it may 
be difficult to make a clinical determination of when a non-bizarre idea crosses the 
threshold from normality to delusion. The clinical concept of ‘overvalued ideas’ is 
intended to be helpful in this regard. Overvalued ideas are placed on the continuum 
between normal ideas and delusions and are defined as ‘an unreasonable and sus-
tained belief that is maintained with less than delusional intensity (i.e., the person is 
able to acknowledge the possibility that the belief may not be true).’82 
The distinction between overvalued ideas and delusions has, however, been prob-
lematised. In the Norwegian 22 July case there was, as we have already touched upon, 
a broad forensic and public discussion of whether the perpetrator’s beliefs were de-
lusional. In the aftermath of this case, some scholars launched the new concept of an 
‘extreme overvalued idea.’83 This was meant to capture the perpetrator’s ‘rigidly held 
extreme beliefs’ that were not psychotic, and not reaching delusional character.84 The 
established term ‘overvalued idea’ was considered to not cover the full complexity of 
the continuum between non-psychotic extreme ideas and delusions with impaired 
reality testing (i.e., psychosis). However, even the introduction of this new term did 
not solve the clinical challenge of correctly classifying extreme and/or idiosyncratic 
77 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2013).
78 Bebbington & Freeman, ‘Transdiagnostic Extension of Delusions: Schizophrenia and Beyond’, 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 43(2) (2017) pp. 273–282.
79 Parnas, ‘The Breivik case and ‘conditio psychiatrica’’, World Psychiatry 12(1) (2013) pp. 22–23.
80 Ibid.
81 Bebbington & Freeman (2017).
82 Veale, ‘Over-valued ideas: a conceptual analysis’, Behaviour Research and Therapy 40(4) (2002) 
pp. 383–400 and American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (2013).
83 Rahman, Resnick & Harry, ‘Anders Breivik: Extreme Beliefs Mistaken for Psychosis’, The 
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 44(1) (2016) pp. 28–35.
84 Rahman, Resnick & Harry (2016).
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beliefs. Other scholars argued that the 22 July perpetrator’s ‘extreme beliefs met the 
definition of delusion, the core symptom of psychosis’,85 because, even though his 
racist views were shared by other extremists, the ‘beliefs about his specific role in 
present and future cleansing projects seemed to be more markedly delusional and 
idiosyncratic’.86 Indeed, it was later emphasised that the main difference between the 
forensic expert report that evaluated the perpetrator as psychotic (i.e., criminally in-
sane) and the one that evaluated him as non-psychotic (i.e., criminally sane) nine 
months later was that, in the latter evaluation, the perpetrator ‘appeared more open 
to alternative explanations concerning his own role, which made the reality testing 
[emphasis added] regarding his grandiose notions appear less impaired’.87 That is, 
the thoughts/beliefs which the first pair of forensic experts classified as grandiose 
delusions, the second pair classified as extremist beliefs. In the first report, the reality 
testing related to his grandiose ideas was impaired, in the second it was not. 
This core difference between the two reports again points towards impaired re-
ality testing as the core of delusions as a psychotic phenomenon. As the discussion 
about the 22 July case shows, this threshold is difficult (if not impossible) to define 
on the basis of ideas or beliefs alone because different scholars and clinicians inter-
pret the beliefs differently. The literature does, however, emphasise the importance of 
a change in the quality of the beliefs when they cross the threshold to delusions and 
this change in quality parallels the transition to reality distortion. That is, the pres-
ence of delusions implies impaired reality testing (and psychosis) and impaired re-
ality testing implies that the beliefs have reached delusional character. The psychosis 
symptom delusions correspond with the qualitative or phenomenological transition 
from intact to impaired reality testing.
9.3 Impaired Reality Testing and Hallucinations
The DSM-5 defines hallucinations as ‘perception-like experiences that occur with-
out an external stimulus. They are vivid and clear, with the full force and impact 
of normal perceptions, and not under voluntary control’.88 For auditory hallucina-
tions, scholars have used various definitions including ‘misperception of inner expe-
riences and thoughts’, ‘misattribution of speech’, or ‘internally generated events that 
are interpreted as being externally generated’.89 Hallucinations appear across senses, 
85 Merikangas, ‘Extreme Beliefs Mistaken for Psychosis’, The Journal of the American Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law 44(3) (2016) p. 407.
86 Bortolotti, Broome, Mameli, ‘Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the 
Breivik Case’, Neuroethics 7(3) (2014) pp. 377–382.
87 Melle (2013).
88 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2013).
89 Hugdahl, ‘Auditory hallucinations: A review of the ERC ‘VOICE’ project’, World Journal of 
Psychiatry 5(2) (2015) pp. 193–209.
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and can be auditory, visual, olfactory (smell), or tactile. The most frequent halluci-
nations in psychosis are the auditory, which affects about 70–80% of patients with 
schizophrenia.90 Like delusions, hallucinations also exist across diagnostic bound-
aries. They may be present in psychiatric disorders that are not primarily defined as 
psychotic, such as borderline personality disorder, dissociative disorder, depression, 
anxiety, autism, and post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as in non-psychiatric dis-
orders such as Parkinson’s disease, stroke, migraine, tumours and sleep disorders 
(see Waters et al91 for a review). Auditory hallucinations also occur in otherwise 
healthy individuals.92 Accordingly, since hallucinations are not always accompanied 
with impaired reality testing, lack of insight or disturbed beliefs, they cannot serve 
to define psychosis by themselves.93 
In order to distinguish the characteristics of auditory hallucinations in persons 
with psychosis from those in persons without psychosis (i.e., otherwise healthy in-
dividuals), Daalman and colleagues studied over 200 persons and found that the 
number, the loudness, and the location (inside or outside the head) of the voices did 
not differ between the groups. The frequency, negative emotional valence, and lack 
of perceived control over the voices, however, were significantly greater in persons 
with psychosis, and the negative emotional valence of the voices could predict the 
presence of a psychotic disorder with almost 90% accuracy.94 This is in concordance 
with the Norwegian professor of psychology Kenneth Hugdahl, who, after decades 
of research on auditory hallucinations, argues that they consist of three phenomena: 
the perceptual experience, the cognitive inability to ignore the voices, and an emo-
tional dimension where the voices have a negative tone.95 Whereas the perceptual 
experience may cross diagnostic borders and occur in healthy individuals, the cog-
nitive and emotional dimension appears to be more related to an actual underlying 
psychotic disorder or a psychotic state. In accordance with this distinction between the 
psychotic and non-psychotic dimension of auditory hallucinations, some scholars 
have suggested to separate the perceptual experience into a diagnosis of ‘perceptu-
al disorders’ consisting of ‘perceptual phenomena causing distress and dysfunction, 
but without any impaired reality testing’.96 With this distinction, they argue that the 
hallucinations become of psychotic character when they represent or co-occur with 
90 Hugdahl (2015).
91 Waters, Blom, Jardri, et al. (2017).
92 Van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, et al., ‘A systematic review and meta-analysis of the psychosis 
continuum: evidence for a psychosis proneness-persistence-impairment model of psychotic 
disorder’, Psychological Medicine 39(2) (2009) pp. 179–195.
93 Waters, Blom, Jardri, et al. (2017). 
94 Daalman, Boks, Diederen, et al., ‘The same or different? A phenomenological comparison of 
auditory verbal hallucinations in healthy and psychotic individuals’, The Journal of Clinical 
Psychiatry 72(3) (2011) pp. 320–325.
95 Hugdahl (2015).
96 Waters, Blom, Jardri, et al. (2017).
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reality distortion. There is a change of quality associated with the transition from the 
perceptual to the psychotic dimension of auditory hallucinations. As Hugdahl writes: 
‘Clinically, what drains the patient both cognitively, emotionally, and physically is the 
ongoing ‘dialogue’ and typically negative comments and commands from the ‘voice’, 
which recruits almost all available cognitive resources […] with the resulting typical 
signs of reality disorientation [emphasis added]’.97 The dimension of reality distortion 
of hallucinations, as opposed to their mere presence, constitutes the core of halluci-
nations as a psychotic phenomenon.
9.4 Impaired Reality Testing and Formal Thought Disorder
The definition of formal thought disorder in the DSM-5 is somewhat vague: ‘Disor-
ganized thinking (formal thought disorder) is typically inferred from the individu-
al’s speech. […] Because mildly disorganized speech is common and unspecific, the 
symptom must be severe enough to substantially impair effective communication’.98 
In general, disorganised speech comprises the phenomena of loose associations, tan-
gential or unrelated answers, and incoherence. A more precise and useful definition 
of thought disorder is given in the research literature: ‘any disturbance that affects 
the form of thinking, including the organisation, control, processing, or expression 
of thoughts.’99 As such, thought disturbances may be understood as a ‘disruption in 
the interconnectivity of meaning and ideas within an individual’.100
Like delusions and hallucinations, thought disturbances are trans-diagnostic 
phenomena which may occur in psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia and bi-
polar disorder, as well as in primarily non-psychotic disorders such as depression, 
personality disorders, neurodegenerative disorders, and stress.101 The significance of 
thought disorder in psychosis dates back to Kräpelin and Bleuler (who were the first 
to describe the condition, and to coin the term ‘schizophrenia’, respectively). Kräpe-
lin described how the deterioration of mental functions in psychosis resulted in ‘de-
railment’ and ‘incoherence’ of thought processes, that were observable through the 
patient’s speech.102 Bleuler described disturbance of thought as the primary manifes-
tation of the ‘splitting’ of mental functions that he considered to be the core of the 
97 Hugdahl (2015).
98 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2013).
99 Hart & Lewine, ‘Rethinking Thought Disorder’, Schizophrenia Bulletin 43(3) (2017) pp. 514-22.
100 Cohen, Le, Fedechko, et al., ‘Can RDoC Help Find Order in Thought Disorder?’ Schizophrenia 
Bulletin 43(3) (2017) pp. 503–508.
101 Hart & Lewine (2017), and Morgan, Coleman, Ulgen, et al., ‘Thought Disorder in 
Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder Probands, Their Relatives, and Nonpsychiatric Controls’, 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 43(3) (2017) pp. 523–535.
102 Hart & Lewine (2017).
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disorder he named schizophrenia (literarily meaning ‘splitting of the mind’).103 
Formal thought disturbances are considered objective and directly observable 
on mental health examinations. This stands in contrast to hallucinations and delu-
sions,104 the presence of which are based on subjective reports from the patient on 
the (sometimes hidden) content of their thoughts. Four qualitative dimensions of 
thought disorders have been described: Associative looseness, combinatory thinking 
(perceptions and ideas are combined in an unrealistic or inappropriate manner), dis-
organised responses (as in confusion or lack of clarity of thought), and idiosyncratic 
word usage.105 
Furthermore, the thought disturbances cluster in two main domains: the ‘disor-
ganised’ and the ‘negative’,106 where the disorganised domain comprises items such 
as incoherence, loss of goal, and circumstantiality. The negative domain comprises 
items such as poverty of speech and speech-content, and may be closer to psychotic, 
i.e., delusional, thought content.107 Understandably, these domains are not specific 
for psychosis, and mild variants of both domains may be present in relatives of psy-
chosis patients and in healthy control groups.108 Importantly, the presence of thought 
disorders has been shown not to differ between currently psychotic and remitted bi-
polar disorder patients.109 This suggests that thought disorders, as such, are indepen-
dent of a current psychotic state. 
How should we then understand the relationship between thought disorders and 
impaired reality testing? On the one hand, thought disturbances are not in them-
selves conclusive for either psychosis or reality distortion. On the other hand, they 
are considered to be a hallmark of psychosis as shown in the early psychosis texts by 
Kräpelin and Bleuler. Indeed, it has been argued that: ‘Breakdowns in the thought 
system [...] is intrinsically linked to difficulties with psychological and social well-
being and the ability to function adaptively in the world. At their extreme, these dis-
turbances are the core of psychotic experiences.’110 That is, the presence of formal 
thought disorders is not sufficient to conclude that a person is psychotic or has im-
paired reality testing. But on the other hand, the presence of thought disturbances 
is thought to be at the core of psychosis. Hence, there appears to be no clear-cut 
103 Ibid.
104 Roche, Creed, MacMahon, et al., ‘The Epidemiology and Associated Phenomenology of Formal 
Thought Disorder: A Systematic Review’, Schizophrenia Bulletin 41(4) (2015) pp. 951–962.
105 Johnston, Assessing Schizophrenia Thinking (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass 1979)
106 Hart & Lewine (2017), Roche, Creed, MacMahon, et al. (2015), and Andreasen, ‘Thought, 
language, and communication disorders. I. Clinical assessment, definition of terms, and 
evaluation of their reliability’, Archives of General Psychiatry 36(12) (1979) pp. 1315–1321.
107 Roche, Creed, MacMahon, et al. (2015).
108 Morgan, Coleman, Ulgen, et al. (2017).
109 Ibid.
110 Hart & Lewine (2017).
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link between thought disturbance as a psychosis symptom and the dimension of im-
paired reality testing.
9.5 Understanding the Dimension of Impaired Reality Testing 
From our previous discussion it has become clear that the relation between impaired 
reality testing and the three core symptoms of psychosis, as understood in the di-
agnostic manuals, is complex. Ultimately, the psychosis threshold appears to corre-
spond with a qualitative change in ideas/beliefs or perceptions, which amounts to 
impaired reality testing. That is, a state where the person’s ability to have an objective 
evaluation of the external world and to differentiate between the external world and 
the internal (their ego or self) is impaired. To a significant extent, it is the presence of 
impaired reality testing that provides the symptoms with their quality of psychosis 
symptoms, and at the same time, impaired reality testing manifests itself through 
these symptoms. This may be as close as we can get to a definition of psychosis based 
on the general medical research literature. The lack of a uniform approach to psy-
chosis and impaired reality testing, both in law and forensic practice, can thus be 
traced back to the lack of unified definitions in research. 
An even more complicated matter in the intersection between law and medi-
cal research concerns the question of the psychosis dimension. As described above, 
Norwegian law requires significantly impaired reality testing for a defendant to be 
evaluated as psychotic in a legal context. From a medical research perspective, im-
paired reality testing seems to correspond with the psychosis threshold as a categor-
ical phenomenon. The question is then, how should we define and potentially prove 
‘significantly impaired reality testing’? 
We will in the following argue that there may be, in principle, different possi-
ble approaches to defining and proving significantly impaired reality testing from 
a medical point of view—but that these approaches need to be further developed. 
More specifically, the main approaches to such a dimensional understanding of real-
ity distortion are: a quantitative, a qualitative, a functional, and perhaps even a neu-
robiological/neuroscientific measure. The quantitative approach includes measur-
ing the psychosis symptoms according to validated semi-structured interviews and 
rating scales. The qualitative approach focuses on the most severe psychopathologi-
cal symptoms such as delusions of control, commenting auditive hallucinations, or 
thought broadcasting. The functional approach is linked to cognitive impairments 
and impaired daily functioning. Finally, a future neurobiological approach could 
provide objective measures of psychosis severity. These different approaches will be 
further explained below, in relation to the problem of proving a relevant state of psy-
chosis. 
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10. Identifying Psychosis from a Medical Research Perspective 
On the assumption that we can define a state of psychosis and impaired reality test-
ing, we ought also to able to identify it in a legal context. But how can we prove 
the presence of psychosis and impaired reality testing, and, more specifically, sig-
nificantly impaired reality testing? We have previously explained how psychosis and 
impaired reality testing are generally evaluated through diagnostic tools and phe-
nomenological approaches. Proving the presence of psychosis is the forensic expert 
clinician’s task. A more general question for the research community is, however, 
whether there are objective neurobiological markers that could facilitate the proving 
of psychosis on the subject level. To date, such markers have not been found and 
those methods do not exist. Even though neuroscience has contributed to our under-
standing of the putative biological mechanisms underpinning psychosis on a general 
level, we are far from being able to use neuroscientific methods to identify psychosis 
on the individual level.111 
Proving psychosis and reality distortion clinically is, however, not sufficient in 
the legal context. As described, the Norwegian law requires significantly impaired re-
ality testing for a defendant to be evaluated as psychotic in a legal context. Moreover, 
the offender’s failing ability to make a realistic assessment of his relationship to the 
surrounding world must be relatively general and include significant aspects of real-
ity. In the previous section, we concluded that impaired reality testing seems to cor-
respond with the psychosis threshold as a categorical phenomenon. The question is, 
then, how should we interpret the legal term ‘significantly impaired reality testing’? 
And importantly, what are the medical correlates to this? 
There are different possible approaches to defining and proving significantly im-
paired reality testing from a medical point of view. Importantly, the way we prove 
the presence of significantly impaired reality testing will follow from our initial defi-
nition of the phenomenon (significantly impaired reality testing). If we define ‘sig-
nificantly’ as either a quantitative, qualitative, functional, or even a neurobiological/
neuroscientific measure, we must follow the same axis to prove its presence. The fol-
lowing is thus meant to exemplify and discuss how significantly impaired reality test-
ing might be proved along these four axes.
One simplistic and operational practice would be to quantify the impaired reali-
ty testing related psychosis symptoms. Indeed, the DSM-5 has introduced specifiers 
for psychosis severity. Each psychosis symptom may be classified on a Likert scale 
from 0–5 where 2 signifies the presence of the symptom (e.g., hallucination, delu-
sion). This quantification may also be conducted by the use of validated symptom 
assessment scales such as the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS), which 
is well known in clinical and forensic practice, as well as in psychosis research. By 
111 Frangou, ‘A Systems Neuroscience Perspective of Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder’, 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 40(3) (2014) pp. 523–531.
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the use of such instruments, the person will get a sum score and a score for specific 
symptom domains, where a higher score reflects a higher symptom load and hence 
a greater severity. Hypothetically, a threshold for significant severity could be set at a 
given sum score. However, not all symptoms included in such sum scores are related 
to the dimension of impaired reality testing. As such, this quantitative approach may 
miss the intention to measure significant impairments in reality testing. To compen-
sate for irrelevant items, items especially relevant to reality testing could be defined 
according to a threshold or summed up, and irrelevant items get omitted. 
Another more qualitative approach is to assess the presence of Schneiderian 
‘first-rank symptoms’, which are commanding or commenting auditive hallucina-
tions, thought insertion or thought broadcasting, or delusions of being controlled/
that someone has taken control over the person’s body or thoughts.112 These specif-
ic delusions and hallucinations are considered as particularly severe because they 
imply a significant reality distortion. Traditionally, the presence of only one of the 
first-rank symptoms has been sufficient for a diagnosis of schizophrenia, but recently 
their value for a schizophrenia diagnosis has been questioned.113 Other researchers 
have questioned their sensitivity but confirmed their specificity.114 More importantly, 
as core psychosis symptoms which are considered as significantly affecting reality 
testing, their presence may point toward fulfilling the significantly impaired reality 
testing required for the legally relevant psychosis criterion. But, even if the presence 
of the first-rank symptoms can be considered to fulfil the criteria for significant re-
ality distortion, we still need to define the threshold for significant reality distortion 
when psychosis symptoms other than the first-rank are present.
A third option could be to address significantly impaired reality testing through 
functional impairments. Cognitive dysfunction has repeatedly been linked to im-
paired function in psychosis.115 Specifically, the neurocognitive domains of verbal 
memory and executive functioning are related to functional outcome.116 However, 
neurocognitive performance may be linked to other factors related to psychosis such 
as medication, relapses and hospitalisations,117 and appear to be stable over time and 
independent of the presence of positive psychosis symptoms (hallucinations, delu-
112 World Health Organization, The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: 
Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines, (World Health Organization 1992).
113 Nordgaard, Arnfred, Handest, et al., ‘The diagnostic status of first-rank symptoms’, 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 34(1) (2008) pp. 137–154.
114 Heinz, Voss, Lawrie, et al., ‘Shall we really say goodbye to first rank symptoms?’, European 
Psychiatry 37 (2016) pp. 8–13.
115 Carrion, McLaughlin, Goldberg, et al., ‘Prediction of functional outcome in individuals at 
clinical high risk for psychosis’, JAMA Psychiatry 70(11) (2013) pp. 1133–1142.
116 Green, Kern, Braff, et al., ‘Neurocognitive deficits and functional outcome in schizophrenia: are 
we measuring the ‘right stuff ’?’, Schizophrenia Bulletin 26(1) (2000) pp. 119–136.
117 Carrion, McLaughlin, Goldberg, et al. (2013).
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sions, thought disturbances).118 As we discussed above, impaired reality testing cor-
responds with the presence of delusions, hallucinations, and thought disturbances, 
but not to cognitive impairments in themselves. It would therefore be insufficient to 
use functional impairments related to cognitive dysfunction as a measure of signifi-
cantly impaired reality testing. 
Finally, one could (in line with recent neuroscientific research) imagine the future 
use of biomarkers as a measure of significant impaired reality testing. For instance, 
MRI studies in psychosis patients have shown reality distortion to be associated with 
grey matter loss and functional abnormalities in the brain.119 If such abnormalities 
were to be quantified, one could imagine a threshold for significantly impaired real-
ity testing as an objective measure obtained in an MRI-scanner. But, despite the fact 
that neuroimaging data has increasingly been admitted in US courts,120 an inherit 
limitation of this research is that the results are on the group-level and may not be 
applicable to single subjects. Moreover, the proven associations are correlational and 
not causal, and may be affected by confounding factors such as medication.121 Even 
though neuroscientific research may point towards associations and mechanisms 
underpinning impaired reality testing, neuroimaging is, to date, far from being a re-
liable approach to measure significantly impaired reality testing in single subjects. 
From this discussion, we can conclude that there are quantitative, qualitative and 
perhaps functional approaches to measuring significantly impaired reality testing as 
this criterion is formulated in the Norwegian law. However, because there are three 
different approaches, all of which have limitations, the choice of any one of the three 
may affect whether a person is evaluated to fulfil the legal psychosis criterion or not. 
11. Discussion and Recommendations 
We have investigated the meaning of psychosis and impaired reality testing as con-
ditions relevant to criminal insanity from the three interrelated perspectives of law, 
forensic practice, and mental health research. As criminal insanity is a legal con-
struct, although a hybrid one, our point of departure was the law. More specifically, 
we started with various criteria for criminal incapacity in section 20 of the Nor-
wegian Penal Code, within which criminal insanity is equated with psychosis (as 
significantly impaired reality testing). This focus on psychosis will remain in Nor-
118 Cornblatt, Carrion, Addington, et al., ‘Risk factors for psychosis: impaired social and role 
functioning’, Schizophrenia Bulletin 38(6) (2012) pp. 1247–1257.
119 Frangou (2014).
120 Farahany, ‘Neuroscience and behavioral genetics in US criminal law: an empirical analysis’, 
Journal of Law and the Biosciences 2(3) (2015) pp. 485–509.
121 See Fjellvang, Gröning & Haukvik, ‘Imaging Violence in Schizophrenia: A Systematic Review 
and Critical Discussion of the MRI Literature’, Frontiers in Psychiatry 9 (2018).
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wegian law after the expected law reform, and is a core of the insanity regulations of 
most countries. 
From a legal perspective it is particularly important to have clear and robust 
criminal insanity rules, because these determine who will be held responsible and 
punished, and who will be acquitted. The justification for the use of a psychosis cri-
terion in the Norwegian Penal Code involves arguments about legal certainty, which 
leaves the impression that this criterion may function as a clear legal cut-off point. 
Our investigation has, however, showed that this is not necessarily the case. Al-
though seemingly concrete, the psychosis criterion used in Norwegian criminal law 
lacks a clear definition. Forensic evaluations that have large impact on who is/is not 
viewed as criminally insane are, to a significant extent, based upon clinical discretion 
within a diagnostic framework that is not suited to legal purposes. Looking at foren-
sic practice in Norway, it becomes clear that the assessment of whether the defendant 
was (legally) psychotic may be challenging. There is no uniform understanding of 
how impaired reality testing should be defined and determined in Norwegian fo-
rensic practice. Experts may emphasise different criteria and different thresholds for 
determining if a person was psychotic. The evaluation may be based on prejudices, 
or on specific conceptions regarding how ill a person must be or how deviant their 
behaviour must be in order for them to be evaluated as criminally insane, more than 
the person’s reality testing abilities. 
The underlying problem seems to be that there is no uniform medical under-
standing of what it is to be psychotic. Moreover, there is a lack of an operationalisa-
tion of impaired reality testing, and the law’s requirement of significantly impaired 
reality testing thus has no obvious medical reference point. This lack of a clear defi-
nition of psychosis is also reflected in the practical challenges in proving the relevant 
state of psychosis. Many practical challenges are also related to the fact that criminal 
insanity evaluations require evaluating the defendant’s state of mind in retrospect. 
The dimensional character of psychopathology also poses a general challenge when 
medicine meets law, where a binary answer is required as to whether the perpetrator 
is criminally sane and responsible or not. 
How can we address these challenges? Given that criminal insanity should be re-
lated to psychosis, we need to develop clearer legal cut-off points, and clearer guide-
lines for forensic practice and the forensic interview. A good interview must, in our 
view, include questions that shed light on the person’s perception of him/herself and 
others, rather than focusing exclusively on symptoms and signs. Through their inter-
view, the experts must also chart the person’s ability to change between perspectives, 
and if the person’s concept of reality has changed or been stable over time and across 
different situations.122 
122 See Jansson & Parnas, ‘Competing Definitions of Schizophrenia: What Can Be Learned From 
Polydiagnostic Studies?’, Schizophrenia Bulletin 33(5) (2006) pp. 1178–1200 on the need to 
integrate a phenomenological perspective. 
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This development of clearer legal cut-off points and forensic guidelines in turn re-
quires the development of clearer legal, medical, and maybe also medio-legal defi-
nitions. Throughout the work with this article it has become increasingly clear to us 
that the law is seeking answers from the medical and neuroscientific research com-
munities that these disciplines, to date, cannot provide. Law and medicine relate to 
distinct research fields, and the concepts and terminology regarding insanity and 
psychosis differ between the two. 
Ultimately, the lack of a clear understanding in law thus points towards the need 
for further research. Moving forward requires considering the characteristics of law 
and medicine (in both its practical and clinical dimensions) together, and developing 
research at the intersection between them. Hopefully this article has made some con-
tributions in that direction. 
